Interessante artigo sobre Carl Schmitt: Springtime for Schmitt. Escrito pelo professor Jeremy A. Rabkin, da George Mason University School of Law, e publicado pelo site Library of Law and Liberty, com alguma atenção dada ao famoso livro "O conceito do político" e apresentando os traços cimeiros do pensamento do jurista alemão, grandemente desenhados no período conturbado de Weimar, e na polémica que manteve com Kelsen (o jurista austríaco autor da Teoria Pura do Direito).
Das críticas ao liberalismo à ideia de "soberania" e "estado de excepção"; perpassando a visão crítica relativamente aos conceitos de democracia e de ditadura , a concepção de "amigo-inimigo" (que entre nós foi seguida também por Cabral de Moncada, com quem manteve longa correspondência). Mas também a relação próxima com o regime Nazi, ainda que mais niilista do que nacional-socialista, como lembrou Heinrich Meier, enquadrando-o antes como um crente dos "absolutos teológicos", afinal um católico que mais tarde se desiludiria com o Concílio Vaticano II.
Um texto interessante que desenvolve alguns destes aspectos, mas sempre insuficiente para conseguir compreender um homem tão complexo e com um pensamento tão profundo. Fica aqui a dica.
"Schmitt was an existentialist before the term existentialism became popular. He called his doctrine “decisionism” but it amounted to much the same thing. In the postwar period, Schmitt welcomed interest in his work from intellectuals of quite varied stripes, even French Leftists. He corresponded with them and sometimes received them at his home in the Rhineland. One could fairly describe Schmitt as a precursor of postmodernism. He beckoned to something beyond the staid calculations of modern bourgeois society— something with more passion and more excitement."
"In fact, what disappears from Schmitt’s account of law and the exception is any sense that individuals have rights with some claim to respect from the law or from the authorities, even when the latter introduce exceptions to the law. In The Concept of the Political, Schmitt salutes the Austrian socialist who characterized rents as “tribute” enforced by the state against owners, and pours scorn on the notion that “private law” (the law protecting private property, private contracts and so on) stands on ground that is any less subject to political challenge than “public law” (regarding government powers and organization). Everything is potentially political, and determining the bounds or application of “the political” is itself a political choice."
"Here, as elsewhere, Schmitt plays on the weak side of liberalism, its penchant for abstract formulas, for legalism, for willful blindness to a variety of human distinctions. Liberalism wants property rights for the rich and the poor, for the fruit of prolonged effort and for a windfall from a lucky investment. It wants to extend the same toleration to religious communities organized around centuries of considered practice as to yesterday’s improvised cult. It protects the speech of the learned scholar and the crackpot dabbler. And it asserts the equality of nations, not only the powerful and the weak, the rich and the poor, but the productive and the turbulent, the peaceful and the belligerent."